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ARBITRATION AMBUSH IN A POLICY POLEMIC 
By 
Amy J. Schmitz* 
 
“po·lem·ic … Etymology: French polémique, from Middle 
French, from polemique controversial, from Greek 
polemikos warlike, hostile, from polemos war; perhaps akin 
to Greek pelemizein to shake, Old English ealfelo baleful . . . 
an aggressive attack on or refutation of the opinions or 




The United States Supreme Court and Congress are embattled in a policy 
polemic over consumer arbitration. This polemic has encompassed questions 
regarding the delegation to private arbitrators of power to resolve business-to-
consumer (“B2C”) disputes. Supreme Court jurisprudence has continued to 
strengthen arbitral power and strict enforcement of arbitration agreements and 
awards under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) over the past thirty years.2 
Moreover, the Court has generally reached pro-business conclusions despite 
sending mixed messages regarding the extent of arbitrators’ power and discretion. 
In particular, the Court’s most recent arbitration opinions reach pro-
business results but arguably conflict with respect to arbitral power. In Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., the Court arguably weakened arbitrator 
discretion by holding that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority or acted in 
manifest disregard by ordering class arbitration where the arbitration agreement 
                                                 
* Amy J. Schmitz, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.  I 
thank Professor Thomas Carbonneau, the Editors and Staff of the Yearbook on Arbitration 
and Mediation Law Review at the Penn State Dickinson School of Law, and all the 
participants in YAM’s 2011 Symposium, “The Arbitrator as Judge and Judge of 
Jurisdiction.”  I also thank Caitlin McHugh, Deborah Moguillansky, and Heather Park for 
their research assistance.   
1 Polemic Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/polemic (last visited July 12, 2010). 
2 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2011). 
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was silent on the class relief issue.3 Shortly thereafter, the Court in Rent-A-Center 
v. Jackson supported arbitrator power by reinforcing its prior rulings that narrow 
judicial review to claims specifically targeting agreements to arbitrate and 
sanctioning provisions allocating to arbitrators the authority to judge their own 
jurisdiction.4 Nonetheless, both opinions pleased business concerns: hinder class 
proceedings; stop judicial challenges to enforcement of arbitration contracts. 
This jurisprudence seems to have fueled a policy push-back against 
arbitration in consumer contexts. Consumer protection initiatives once promoted 
private dispute resolution as means for efficiently settling consumers’ claims. 
Recent congressional initiatives, however, challenge the Supreme Court’s pro-
arbitration jurisprudence by seeking to ban or limit arbitration in consumer 
contracts. This can be seen in renewed efforts to enact the Arbitration Fairness Act 
(“AFA”), which would ban pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer, 
employment, and civil rights contexts.5 
In addition, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank”), signed into law on July 21, 2010, has placed arbitration in a 
firestorm of issues regarding public power and control over private contracts.6 
Opponents and banking industry groups have denounced Dodd-Frank as creating 
expensive regulatory fluff in a campaign to take over private business and interfere 
with freedom of contract.7 Dodd-Frank supporters and consumer advocates, 
                                                 
3 See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
4 Rent-A-Ctr, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-80 (2010) (upholding the validity 
of a clause delegating to the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide arbitration agreements’ 
enforceability). 
 5 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Developments 
in the Law — 
Access to Courts, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Proposals for Reform of Consumer-
Defendant Arbitration, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1170 , 1170-81 (2009) [hereinafter Access to 
Courts] (discussing the AFA and critiquing its blanket approach). 
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376  (July 21, 2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. 
7 Dave Clarke & Jeff Roberts, Tea Party Leader Calls for Repeal of Dodd-Frank, 
WESTLAW NEWS & INSIGHT, Jan. 5, 2011, available 
at http://westlawnews.thomson.com/Securities_Litigation/News/2011/01_-
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however, welcomed the Act as an engine for much-needed public oversight and 
consumer protection from rampant abuse of private power.8  
This public/private debate led to Dodd-Frank provisions that target 
consumer arbitration as a suspect privatization of consumer claim resolution. In 
particular, the Act bans enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in mortgage 
contracts and with respect to claims under the whistle-blower provisions of the 
Act.9 Next, it calls for the creation of a Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”) to serve as the centralized agency in charge of writing and enforcing 
various lending and consumer protection regulations, which may include a 
prohibition or limitations on enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in 
consumer financial products and services contracts.10 Finally, the Act gives the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) power to limit or prohibit 
agreements requiring customers of any broker or dealer to arbitrate future disputes 
arising under federal securities laws.11 
These legislative and regulatory initiatives collide with the Supreme 
Court’s pro-arbitration stance, instigating a battle with arbitration in the front lines 
of a consumer policy polemic. The Court continues to limit judicial review of 
                                                                                                                            
_January/Tea_Party_leader_calls_for_repeal_of_Dodd-Frank/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) 
(highlighting opponents’ challenges against the Act, and plans to call for its repeal). 
8 See Ben Protess, New York Consumer Bureau Reaches Out to Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, 
DEALBOOK (Nov. 26, 2010), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/11/26/new-
consumer-bureau-reaches-out-to-wall-street/?scp=1&sq=dodd-
frank+%22consumer+watchdog%22&st=nyt (last visited Jan. 10, 2011) (noting consumer 
advocates’ positivity regarding the Act). 
9 Dodd-Frank § 1414. The provision amends the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) and is 
codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c) (the Act’s effective date for provisions that do not call for 
regulations is July 22, 2010). 
10 Dodd-Frank § 1028; see also Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 
3126, 111th Cong. (2009) (bill that is now the Dodd-Frank Act establishing an agency to 
regulate consumer financial products and services and authorizing the agency to approve 
pilot programs for effective disclosure of consumer contract terms); David S. Evans & 
Joshua D. Wright, How the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 Would 
Change the Law and Regulation of Consumer Financial Products, 2 BLOOMBERG L. REP.: 
RISK AND COMPLIANCE 9, 9-14 (Oct. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1491117 
(critiquing the Dodd-Frank Act for advocating broad applications without adequate 
evidentiary basis). 
11 Dodd-Frank § 921 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (1934)). 
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arbitration and support strict enforcement of arbitration agreements. Meanwhile, 
legislators and policymakers seek to curtail use of arbitration to resolve consumer 
claims, resulting in a seeming ambush against arbitration clauses. This Article 
discusses the competing arbitration policies of the Court and legislators, and urges 
a truce in the policy polemic through adoption of an alternative to all-or-nothing 
enforcement of arbitration contracts. Instead, companies should remain free to 
require arbitration in their B2C contracts conditioned on their compliance with 
clear procedural fairness rules.12 
Part II of the Article depicts the evolution of arbitration law and courts’ 
enforcement of arbitration agreements leading up to and including the Supreme 
Court’s recent holdings in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. and Rent-
A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson. Part III then discusses the legislative policy shift 
regarding private resolution of consumer disputes, and highlights the recent 
consumer protection initiatives that target consumer arbitration. Part IV raises 
questions regarding the propriety and effects of this arbitration ambush, and offers 
suggestions for carefully considered reforms that protect consumers without overly 
impeding beneficial use of arbitration. Part V concludes with a call for 
consideration of measured regulations that would rescue and revive arbitration 
from ambush. 
 
                                                 
12 I have argued for procedural fairness regulations in lieu of an all-or-nothing approach in 
the past. See Amy J. Schmitz, Regulation Rash? Questioning the AFA’s Approach for 
Protecting Arbitration Fairness, 28 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 16, 16-35 
(2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548670 [hereinafter Schmitz, Regulation 
Rash] (critiquing the AFA’s approach and offering suggestions for procedural fairness 
regulations); Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumers’ Warranty Woes Through Regulated 
Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 627-32, 661-86 (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270827 [hereinafter Schmitz, Warranty Woes] (discussing the 
need for procedural protections in consumer arbitration proceedings); Amy J. Schmitz, 
Dangers of Deference to Form Arbitration Provisions, 8 NEV. L.J. 37, 37–55 (2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1230011 [hereinafter Schmitz, Deference] (advancing 
procedural regulation of arbitration in lieu of precluding arbitration). 
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II. EVOLUTION OF PRO-ENFORCEMENT ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE  
 
Arbitration has had a long history. It emerged during ancient times and became a 
system for business parties to privately resolve their disputes. Furthermore, it has grown to 
encompass systems for keeping consumer, employment, and all types of claims out of the 
public courts. At the same time, courts once suspicious of arbitration now must strictly 
enforce arbitration agreements under the FAA and United States Supreme Court 
jurisprudence.   
  
A. Emergence of Arbitration and its Statutory Scheme 
 
Arbitration developed as a means for providing private and self-contained 
dispute resolution that culminates in a third-party determination, independent from 
the judiciary.13 Common law courts’ fear of this private power with respect to 
dispute resolution, however, led courts to stymie enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate. This prompted passage of the FAA to mandate specific enforcement of 
arbitration agreements and limited judicial review of arbitration awards.14 FAA 
drafters sought to create a remedial scheme aimed to ensure arbitration’s 
independence from the judiciary.15 
                                                 
13 Wharton Poor, Arbitration Under the Federal Statute, 36 YALE L. J. 667, 676-78 (1927) 
(emphasizing arbitration’s independence, but noting arbitration “can by no means be relied 
upon as a solution of all litigious matters”); WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AWARDS 792-97 (1930) (discussing courts’ power 
struggles with arbitration). 
14 Poor, supra note 13, at 674-75 (explaining drafters’ insistence that “once the parties have 
agreed upon arbitration, they must accept the result the arbitrator reaches no matter how 
obviously and plainly wrong it appears”). 
15 See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (citing and quoting Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)) (reiterating FAA’s “purpose was to 
reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at 
English common law and had been adopted by American courts”). 
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1. Craving and Concern for Arbitration’s Independence from the 
Courts 
Arbitration “took its rise in the very infancy of Society” as a private and 
self-contained process, independent from the public courts.16 Communities created 
arbitration systems designed to quickly and efficiently determine disputes in 
accordance with local norms and customs and to provide private and equitable 
determinations that contributed to peace preservation in communal contexts.17 
These self-contained arbitration systems served community and judicial needs for 
efficient, economical, equitable, and private proceedings.18 
Merchant and trade groups are prime examples of communities that have 
relied on arbitration’s function of providing efficient and economical means for 
adjudicating disputes in accordance with local norms, standards, and rules.19 For 
example, the New York Chamber of Commerce immediately established an 
arbitration system when it was founded in 1768, and continued to operate its 
independent system during the American Revolutionary War despite the closure of 
                                                 
16 JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 25 (1918) (quoting 
JOHN MONTGOMERIE BELL, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ARBITRATION IN SCOTLAND 1 (John 
Kirkpatrick ed., 2d ed. 1877)). 
17 Id. at 22-27 (emphasizing arbitration’s special utility); Earl S. Wolaver, The Historical 
Background of Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 144 (1934) (quoting 
GERARD MALYNES, CONSUEDO, VEL, LEX MERCATORIA: OR, THE LAW MERCHANT: 
DIVIDED INTO THREE PARTS, ACCORDING TO THE ESSENTIAL PARTS OF TRAFFICK 
NECESSARY FOR ALL STATESMEN, JUDGES, MAGISTRATES, TEMPORAL AND CIVIL 
LAWYERS, MINT-MEN, MERCHANTS, MARINERS AND OTHERS NEGOTIATING IN ALL PLACES 
OF THE WORLD 303 (1622)); see also James A.R. Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and 
Obligations in the International Sports Arena, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 357 (2001) (noting 
communal acceptance of arbitration in modern international sports). 
18 See FRANCES A. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 3-611 (1948); Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration 
Law, 37 YALE L. J. 595, 597-8 (1928); Margit Mantica, Arbitration in Ancient Egypt, 12 
ARB. J. 155 , 155-59 (1957) (noting functions of arbitration as an independent process). 
19 COHEN, supra note 16, at 25-38, 71-72, 78; LUJO BRENTANO, ON THE HISTORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF GILDS AND THE ORIGIN OF TRADE-UNIONS 33-39 (1870) (noting 
development of “guild law” in England to preserve liberty from neighboring nobles); Harry 
Baum & Leon Pressman, The Enforcement of Commercial Arbitration Agreements in the 
Federal Courts, 8 N.Y.U. L. Q. 238, 246 (1930) (noting arbitration systems among trade 
associations). 
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the public courts.20 Merchant groups valued arbitrators’ specialized understanding 
of commercial issues and industry norms, and informal procedures that fostered 
continuing business relationships.21 Furthermore, arbitration’s privacy and self-
contained process protected disputants from public exposure and embarrassment of 
litigation. 
As arbitration’s popularity grew among trade and business communities, 
courts began to perceive arbitration as a threat to their power.22 In 1609, Lord Coke 
stated in Vynior’s Case the “revocability doctrine,” denouncing enforcement of 
arbitration agreements based on the theory that parties are free to revoke 
arbitrators’ power at any time before they issue an award.23 This doctrine was 
legally disingenuous, however, in that it eschewed contract enforcement principles 
and improperly treated impartial arbitrators as agents subject to the parties’ 
control.24 
Courts’ distrust of arbitration similarly led to their creation of the “ouster” 
doctrine to support courts’ refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate. Under this 
doctrine, courts held that parties could not contractually “oust” courts’ 
jurisdiction.25 This doctrine revealed hostility for arbitration, however, as courts 
continued to enforce settlement agreements and arbitration awards that had the 
same “ouster” effects as arbitration contracts.26 The business community 
                                                 
20 William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A Brief 
Survey, 1956 WASH. U. L. Q. 193, 207-12 (1956).   
21COHEN, supra note 16 at 71-72; Baum & Pressman, supra note 19, at 238, 250. 
22COHEN, supra note 16, at 83. Arbitration threatened a significant source of judicial 
business, as well as judicial jobs linked to the courts’ caseloads. 
23 Vynior’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (1609). Lord Coke’s dicta is now widely known among 
arbitration students and scholars, but has gained infamy for its “unsoundness”; COHEN, 
supra note 16, at 126-27. 
24 Sayre, supra note 18, at 598-607 (discussing “revocability” doctrine). 
25 Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746); COHEN, supra note 16, at 153, 164-70 
(discussing “ouster” rule). 
26 See Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 121 (1924) (discussing the 
confused state of the law before the enactment of the FAA).  
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responded with proposals for legislation requiring courts to put aside their jealousy 
of arbitration and enforce arbitration agreements.27 
2. Enactment of Arbitration Law to Combat Courts’ Distrust  
 
Originally, policymakers enacted international, federal, and state 
arbitration law intending to target enforcement of arbitration in business and trade 
contexts. This coincided with arbitration’s roots and confronted courts’ reluctance 
to share their power with arbitrators in these coveted contexts. Industry groups 
therefore created and pushed for such arbitration laws, and legislators enacted the 
laws with little debate or fanfare. 
On the international level, the United States is among the vast majority of 
countries that have adopted the New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”). This treaty 
seeks to insulate arbitration from parochial intrusions and generally mandates strict 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards in accordance with parties’ 
agreements.28 The United States Congress implemented this Convention through 
Chapter Two of the FAA, and courts have applied this law with a pro-enforcement 
glaze to promote both arbitration and international comity.29 This has helped 
                                                 
27 Poor, supra note 13, at 667, 74-75 (discussing development of 1854 English law to 
combat judicial distrust of arbitration).  
28 ALAN REDFERN, MARTIN HUNTER, NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, 
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 68-9 (3d ed. 1999); 
The United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, June 10, 1958, 
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
arts.1-16, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-
conv/1958_NYC_CTC-e.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) [hereinafter New York 
Convention]; United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), Status:  1958 – 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (noting 144 countries had adopted the New York Convention).   
29 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (implementing the New York Convention), 
§§ 301-307 (implementing the Panama Convention); Kenneth F. Dunham, International 
Arbitration is Not Your Father’s Oldsmobile Convention, 2 J. DISP. RESOL. 323, 326-31 
(2005) (discussing importance of the treaty and parties’ power to dictate arbitration 
procedures under the New York Convention).  
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propel the popularity of arbitration in international contexts, and elevate United 
States courts as venues for enforcing arbitration agreements and awards.30 
United States courts similarly enforce domestic arbitration agreements 
under Chapter One of the FAA31 and its state counterpart, the Uniform Arbitration 
Act (“UAA”).32 These laws require courts to specifically enforce domestic 
arbitration agreements, and they augment this mandate with provisions for liberal 
venue, immediate appeal from orders adverse to arbitration, appointment of 
arbitrators if parties cannot do so by agreement, limited review of arbitration 
awards, and treatment of awards as final judgments.33 Furthermore, courts apply 
FAA review standards narrowly in order to protect the independence and finality 
of arbitration.34 At the same time, the Supreme Court consistently has held that the 
FAA preempts states from singling out arbitration for special treatment or 
otherwise hindering the enforcement of arbitration in contracts affecting interstate 
commerce. This leaves states with little power to regulate consumer arbitration 
provisions beyond application of general contract defenses.35  
                                                 
30 See Christopher R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Arbitration in the United 
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 233, 233-255 (2006) (noting choice of United States law and 
venue in international arbitration contexts). 
31 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. 
32 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. § 1 (2000). The UAA is model legislation that nearly 
all states have adopted to require the same basic enforcement for local arbitration 
agreements and awards beyond the purview of the FAA. Id.  
33 See Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through 
Functional Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 124–35 (2002), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=943528 (discussing the FAA’s pro-efficiency remedial 
provisions). 
34 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995) (emphasizing that an 
arbitrator’s decision will be set aside “only in very unusual circumstances”); IDS Life Ins. 
Co. v. Royal Alliance Assocs., Inc., 266 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2001) (refusing to vacate an 
award despite a record “suggest[ing] that the arbitrators lacked the professional 
competence required to resolve the parties disputes”). 
35 See Doctor’s Assocs. Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (finding the FAA limits 
challenges to arbitration agreements to general contract defenses, and therefore preempted 
state notice requirements that singled out arbitration clauses for special treatment); Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (holding the FAA preempted 
Alabama law limiting consumer arbitration); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 
(1984) (holding that the FAA applies in federal and state court). 




B. Courts’ Strict Enforcement of Arbitration 
 
The Supreme Court’s pro-enforcement reading of the FAA sanctions 
arbitrability of statutory rights unless Congress expressly precludes arbitration, and 
otherwise limits courts’ scrutiny of arbitration agreements to general contract 
defenses such as lack of assent, unconscionability, or fraud.36 Many courts then 
apply these general defenses in narrow and formalistic fashions.37 In addition, 
courts heed the Court’s holdings in cases, such as Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. 
Cardegna, that require courts to narrowly limit their scrutiny of arbitration 
provisions to only those challenges that target the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement itself, and do not merely implicate the enforceability of the underlying 
contract.38 Moreover, the Court’s holding in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson 
has further limited this scrutiny by sanctioning contract provisions allowing 
arbitrators to determine the validity and scope of their own jurisdiction.39   
 
1. Arbitrability of Statutory Rights 
 
The Supreme Court has held that statutory claims may be arbitrated unless 
the statute expressly precludes arbitration or there is very strong evidence that 
arbitration would severely hinder the statute’s purpose. It therefore has condoned 
arbitration of a broad range of statutory claims extending to discrimination, 
                                                 
36 See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (applying preemption). 
37 See Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. 
REV. 73 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270836 [hereinafter Schmitz, 
Unconscionability] (discussing formalistic application of contract defenses). 
38 Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (holding the illegality 
defense at issue was for the arbitrator and not the court because the defense did not target 
the arbitration clause); see also Richard L. Barnes, Buckeye, Bull’s-Eye, or Moving Target:  
The FAA, Compulsory Arbitration, and Common-law Contracts, 31 VT. L. REV. 141, 174-
75, 184 (2006) (discussing the narrowing impact of Buckeye). 
39 Rent-A-Ctr, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-80 (2010) (holding clause in 
employment contract delegating to the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide arbitration 
agreements’ enforceability was a valid delegation under the FAA). 
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consumer lending, and securities fraud.40 Furthermore, courts have uniformly held 
that arbitration of statutory claims does not constitute state action subject to 
constitutional due process requirements.41 Most courts also construe arbitration 
clauses broadly to cover tort and statutory claims regardless of whether a clause 
gives express notice of such coverage.42   
The majority of courts have therefore held that statutory consumer claims 
such as Magnusson Moss Warranty Act (“MMWA”) claims may be subject to 
arbitration.43 Courts have found MMWA claims are arbitrable even in cases where 
the applicable arbitration provision requires consumers to arbitrate outside of their 
home jurisdictions or requires consumers to pay administrative and filing fees in 
asserting small dollar claims.44 In addition, courts often deny consumers’ claims 
that high arbitration initiation costs have an undue “chilling effect” on their 
statutory rights.45   
                                                 
40 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1989) 
(overruling prior opinion to hold securities claims arbitrable); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. 
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000) (finding TILA claims may be subject to binding 
arbitration under the FAA). 
41 See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of 
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1714-23, 1745-62 (2006) (arguing 
conclusion that private arbitration does not involve state action with respect to arbitral class 
actions). 
42 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 624-26 (1991) (finding 
statutory age discrimination statute could be subject to arbitration, explaining that 
arbitration clauses are little more than specialized forum selection clauses). 
43 See Schmitz, Warranty Woes, supra note 12, at 627-32, 641-50 (2008) (discussing 
courts’ holdings with respect to the arbitrability of MMWA claims). 
44 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 , 1147-50 (7th Cir. 1997); and Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari,  Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 1997 WL 33561488 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(rejecting the Hills’ claim that they should not be compelled to arbitrate their MMWA 
claims regarding a $4,000 computer because the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC) rules incorporated in the form arbitration clause required the Hills to pay upwards of 
$4,000 in arbitration costs). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1337-
41 (D. Kan. 2000) (refusing to follow Hill regarding enforcement of same clause). 
45 See, e.g., James v. McDonald’s Corp., 417 F.3d 672, 675-80 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting 
cost-based challenge of arbitration agreement). 
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It is difficult for consumers to satisfy the burden set by the Supreme Court 
in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph of proving prohibitive arbitration costs.46 In 
that case, the Court found that the consumer claimants failed to prove that their 
inability to pay arbitration costs would preclude vindication of their consumer 
protection claims under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) because they had not 
established their lack of sufficient financial resources and liability for all 
arbitration costs.47 The Court considered arbitrators’ discretion to limit or excuse 
fees for consumers unable to pay costs, and seemed to give credence to the 
lender’s offer at the oral arguments to pay costs if the costs proved to be 
prohibitive.48   
That said, some consumers have been successful in challenging 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement by showing that the high costs of 
arbitration are likely to hinder the consumers from vindicating their statutory 
rights.49 Nonetheless, consumers who are successful in challenging arbitration of 
their statutory claims may nonetheless face costs and burdens of asserting statutory 
claims in court while arbitrating the tort and contract claims stemming from the 
                                                 
46 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91-92 (2000) (finding that although 
Randolph had provided information regarding high AAA arbitration fees and costs, it was 
not clear that she would bear these costs and that she could not pay them). 
47 Id.   
48 See id.; Oral Argument of Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph at 21 (US. Oct. 3, 2000), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/99-1235.pdf. 
(Although it is laudable for businesses to offer to pay such costs, such post-hoc offers allow 
them to avoid changing their contracts ex ante, thus reserving the benefits of such 
assistance to only those who expend resources and time to challenge cost provisions); see 
also, James, 417 F.3d at 675-80 (emphasizing that consumers would have to show that 
arbitration was truly more expensive than litigation in terms of overall costs); Bailey v. 
Ameriquest Mtg. Co., 346 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding cost challenge of 
arbitrability was for the arbitrator under the parties’ agreement); Phillips v. Assocs. Home 
Equity Servs., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 840, 847-48 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (stating that the court 
would reconsider its ruling denying enforcement of an arbitration clauses due to high costs 
if the defendants agreed to pay these costs).   
49 See Ball v. SFX Broad., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238-240 (N.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding 
employee had satisfied the burden of proving prohibitive arbitration costs she could not 
bear). 
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same facts.50 They also may have to arbitrate statutory claims against some, but not 
all, of the parties who may bear responsibility for the claims.51 This may leave the 
consumers in a procedural morass laden with costs and hassles. 
 
2. Common Law Contract Defenses 
 
The chief challenges of arbitration provisions are based on general contract 
defenses such as lack of assent, unconscionability, no consideration, or fraud.52 As 
noted, these challenges are only for the court to decide if they target an arbitration 
clause.53 Furthermore, some courts have been formalistic in their applications of 
these defenses, while others have been more receptive to these claims in consumer 
and employment contexts. This has left unclear and uncertain case law, which 
generates litigation and decreases efficiency benefits arbitration seeks to provide.54  
 
                                                 
50 Browne v. Kline Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 828-33 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(allowing litigation of MMWA claims, but ordering arbitration of TILA and state statutory 
and common law claims arising out of car sale); Ball, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 238-240 
(requiring arbitration of the employee’s non-statutory claims although she had prevailed on 
her cost-based challenge on the statutory claims).   
51 See Ex parte Jones, 686 So. 2d 1166 , 1166-68 (Ala. 1996) (finding there was no 
agreement to arbitrate between consumers and the non-signatory to the arbitration 
agreement); Ex parte Martin, 703 So. 2d 883, 886-88 (Ala. 1996) (holding arbitration 
clause in loan agreement between buyers and sellers did not apply to manufacturer); but see 
Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Ala. 1996) (enforcing arbitration against a 
consumer on behalf of non-signatory manufacturer based on broad arbitration clause).   
52 See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes, L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(emphasizing that “courts can consider individual claims of fraud or unconscionability in 
arbitration agreements as they would in any other contract”). 
53 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) 
(solidifying the  “separability” concept limiting courts’ consideration to attacks on an 
arbitration clause itself); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443-449 
(2006) (emphasizing that the separability rule is a matter of federal law that precludes the 
court from deciding defenses going to a contract as a whole, including claims that the 
contract was illegal).   
54 See Rent-A-Ctr, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-80 (2010) (exemplifying 
years of litigation over an arbitration clause). 





The most common challenges of arbitration clauses are based on 
unconscionability. This general contract defense generally requires consumers to 
prove that an arbitration agreement is both substantively and procedurally 
unconscionable.55 Procedural unconscionability focuses on whether the bargaining 
process was unduly one-sided, whereas substantive unconscionability asks whether 
the terms of the provision are oppressive or otherwise unfair.56 These claims have 
been successful, but the doctrine’s malleable standards leave consumers with 
limited and uncertain results on their unconscionability claims.57 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court is currently considering AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 
which questions how far state courts may go in using unconscionability to strike 
arbitration clauses.58 The Court will determine whether the FAA preempts a state 
from applying unconscionability to condition enforcement of arbitration 
agreements in consumer cases involving small dollar claims on the consumers’ 
freedom to proceed in class-wide arbitration.59 
Consumers’ unconscionability challenges of an arbitration clause generally 
begin with a showing that the company provides the challenged arbitration clause 
                                                 
55 Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3rd Cir. 2003) (noting both 
elements of unconscionability under most state contract law). 
56 See id. at 266 (finding “take-it-or-leave-it” contract prepared by the employer without 
negotiation by the employees was procedurally unconscionable); Ingle v. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1175 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding one-year limitation on claims 
under the arbitration clause in an employment contract was substantively unconscionable 
because it deprived employees of the benefit of the continuing violations doctrine available 
under a state employment discrimination statute).   
57 See Schmitz, Unconscionability, supra note 37, at 73-90 (exploring development, 
evolution, and functions of unconscionability, and critiquing courts’ formulaic application 
of unconscionability).     
58 AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, No. 09-893 (U.S. filed Jan. 25, 2010). Oral 
arguments were on November 9, 2010, and an opinion should be forthcoming by spring 
2011.  Attorneys and academics have stated that the outcome of this case could have 
significant impact on the future of consumer arbitration.); see Kimberly Atkins, Future of 
Arbitration in Supreme Court’s Hands, Lawyers USA, Nov. 15, 2010 at 299 (highlighting 
arguments). 
59 See  AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. No. 09-893 (U.S. filed Jan. 25, 2010). 
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without negotiation.60 The challenges then seek to prove that the clause contains 
oppressive terms such as “carve-outs” for the sellers’ option to litigate, cost and fee 
allocations that overly burden consumers, inconvenient arbitration hearing 
locations, and preclusions of statutory remedies.61 A court may then find the whole 
arbitration clause, or only certain provisions, unconscionable.62 If the court finds 
all or part of the clause unconscionable, the court may refuse to order arbitration or 
sever the offending procedures before directing the parties to arbitrate.63 
  Some courts are more receptive to these unconscionability challenges, and 
this has been particularly true in states such as California.64 For example, the court 
in Ting v. AT&T Corp. held that a confidentiality provision in AT&T’s Consumer 
Services Agreement was unconscionable under California law due to concerns that 
the clause would allow AT&T to hide its transgressions.65 The court in that case 
emphasized that AT&T’s routine use of this clause allowed it to potentially prevent 
seven million Californians from obtaining information regarding discrimination 
claims against the company, including evidence consumers would need to prove 
patterns of discrimination or intentional misconduct. The confidentiality clause 
also provided AT&T undue advantages in gathering knowledge on how to 
                                                 
60 See Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing 
adhesion contracts).   
61 See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS, 
113-14 (2002) (listing suspect terms and citing cases supporting and denying these claims). 
62 Harold Allen’s Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Butler, 825 So. 2d 779, 781,785 
(Ala. 2002) (finding that selection of a provision giving consumer no opportunity to select 
arbitrator was fundamentally unfair). 
63 See id. (severing the unconscionable provision and affirming the court’s right to appoint 
an arbitrator). 
64 See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692-94 (Cal. 
2000) (holding contract requiring employees to arbitrate wrongful termination and other 
employment claims unconscionable under California contract law); Abramson v. Juniper 
Networks, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 422, 442-44 (Ct. App. 2004) (voiding an  arbitration clause 
in an employment contract due to the unconscionability of the clause’s cost-sharing and 
“carve-out” provisions). 
65 Ting v. AT&T Corp., 319 F.3d 1126, 1133, 1149–52 n.16 (9th Cir. 2003) (the secrecy 
provision stated, “[a]ny arbitration shall remain confidential. Neither you nor AT&T may 
disclose the existence, content or results of any arbitration or award, except as may be 
required by law or to confirm and enforce an award.”).  
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negotiate its form contracts and control claims.66   
However, most courts have been hesitant to strike arbitration provisions as 
unconscionable.67 In Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., for example, the 
court denied the consumers’ challenge of an arbitration provision in their loan 
agreements although the provision subjected the consumers to high arbitration and 
appeal costs and precluded class relief.68 The court rejected the trial court’s 
findings that the arbitration provision was unduly one-sided, and stymied low 
income consumers’ access to remedies by requiring them to assert their claims 
individually before arbitrators with average daily rates of $1,225.69 The court 
reasoned that litigation would likely cost more than arbitration overall, and class 
action waivers are generally enforceable.70 
 
b. Lack of Assent, Consideration, and Misrepresentation 
 
Other contract defenses such as lack of assent or consideration, and 
misrepresentation remain available for challenging arbitration clauses. Although 
they can sometimes be successful, these claims are very narrow and generally 
difficult to establish. Furthermore, consumers usually face an uphill battle in 
making these claims due to many courts’ applications of classical contract 
                                                 
66 Id. at 1152 (the court’s holding may have been the impetus for AT&T re-writing its 
confidentiality provision); Id. at n.16; see also Acorn v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 
2d 1160, 1172 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding confidentiality provision in arbitration agreement 
unconscionable); McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 858-59 (Wash. 2008) (holding the 
same provision unconscionable, highlighting concerns that the confidentiality provision 
augmented repeat player advantages).   
67 See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters., Inc v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069 (5th Cir. 2002) (denying 
unconscionability challenge to an arbitration agreement); Johnnie’s Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 
790 So. 2d 956, 963-65 (Ala. 2003) (enforcing a consumer’s duty to arbitrate warranty, 
fraud, breach, and other claims); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Lewis, 813 So. 2d 820 (Ala. 
2001) (denying unconscionability challenge to arbitration clause by illiterate consumer); 
Garcia v. Wayne Homes, L.L.C., 2002 Ohio 1884 (App. 2002) (denying unconscionability 
challenge based on risk of prohibitive arbitration costs).   
68 Tillman v. Commer. Credit Loans, Inc., 629 S.E.2d 865, 868-80 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
69 Id. at 868-82. 
70 Id. at 868-74. 
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principles and endorsement of form terms as means for fostering efficiencies 
companies may pass on to consumers through lower prices and better quality 
goods and services.71 Courts therefore have enforced pre-printed form terms in 
papers sent with bills, product packaging, and “click-wrap” e-provisions accessible 
through links in contracts formed over the Internet.72   
For example, the court in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc. enforced an 
arbitration clause located in purchase terms buried among the papers that came 
with a computer the Hills bought over the phone.73 The court emphasized in 
finding valid assent that it is the consumers’ duty to read form terms and that strict 
enforcement of form terms fosters efficient contracting.74 Furthermore, the court 
upheld the arbitration clause although it precluded class relief and curtailed the 
Hills’ right to recover attorney fees under the MMWA.75  
Courts have applied this same reasoning to find assent to arbitration 
clauses in cellular phone service contracts where consumers must accept the 
clauses or cancel the services.76 Courts also have enforced arbitration clauses 
contained in the packaging of products consumers did not purchase but received as 
gifts.77 Furthermore, courts have rejected challenges of arbitration clauses that 
automatically become effective unless the recipient proactively opts out or 
otherwise disputes the clause within a stated time.78 In all these cases, courts 
                                                 
71 See Peter A. Alces, Guerilla Terms, 56 EMORY L.J. 1511, 1515-20 (2007) (discussing 
tensions between objective and subjective enforcement theories); Robert A. Hillman & 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
429, 435-51, 485-87 (2002) (explaining why electronic contracts promote efficiency and 
are not adhesion contracts). 
72 See Alces, supra note 71, at 1521-24 (discussing the expanding world of contracting 
practices). 
73 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F. 3d 1147, 1147-50 (7th  Cir. 1997). 
74 Id. at 1148-50 (stating that “approve-or-return” provisions such as that in Hill make 
consumers better off “as a group”). 
75 Id. 
76 Chandler v. AT&T Wireless Servs., Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d 701, 704-706 (S.D. Ill. 2005). 
77 Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 2000 WL 307369 *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 16, 2000) 
(enforcing arbitration clause in the box with a computer she received as a gift). 
78 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Najd, 294 F.3d 1104, 1108-1110 (9th  Cir. 2002). 
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seemingly condone the illusory nature of consent to form agreements and change 
provisions that have become the norm in consumer and employment contexts. 
At the same time, courts also are prone to deny lack of consideration 
claims under classical notions of contract. Most courts find that arbitration 
provisions are supported by adequate consideration if they are mutual or the 
arbitration clause is one of many promises in a contract.79 Nonetheless, consumers 
sometimes prevail on such claims where they can show that a clause is non-mutual 
or heavily one-sided.80 Still, many courts will strive to find other contract 
provisions or circumstances that constitute sufficient consideration to uphold these 
arbitration clauses.81   
Fraud and misrepresentation claims also meet very limited success.82 As is 
true with all arbitration clause challenges, the claims must target the arbitration 
provision and not the contract as a whole.83 Furthermore, fraud claimants bear a 
heavy burden in proving that the contract drafter intentionally or recklessly made 
material misrepresentations about the arbitration that the claimants relied on in 
accepting the arbitration provision.84 It is generally not sufficient to claim that a 
seller’s failure to disclose an arbitration clause impinged the consumers’ rights. 85 
                                                 
79 Hawkins v. Aid Ass’n for Lutherans, 338 F.3d 801, 808 (7th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing 
that consideration need not lie in the arbitration provision itself where the initial contracts 
allow for subsequent changes).   
80 See Arnold v. United Co. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 858-62 (W. Va. 1998) 
(holding arbitration provision in consumer loan contract unconscionable where form 
provision allowed lender to seek foreclosure and collection actions in court). 
81See Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 341-44 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) 
(denying consumers’ challenge of an arbitration provision in a financing contract that 
allowed the lender to litigate collection and foreclosure suits, emphasizing that courts 
almost uniformly reject such challenges). 
82 See, e.g., In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756-58 (Tex. 2001) (challenging 
arbitration based on fraud, along with unconscionability, duress, and revocation). 
83 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co, 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (holding 
that fraud in the inducement is an arbitrability question for the court unless it goes directly 
to the arbitration clause). 
84 See Firstmerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 758. 
85 Id. at 752-53, 758-59 (denying consumers’ fraud challenge of an arbitration addendum to 
a mobile home sales agreement based on seller’s nondisclosure); but see Prudential Ins. Co. 
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3. Recent Supreme Court Reinforcement of Arbitration Contracts  
  
Supreme Court pronouncements over the past thirty years have created 
substantive federal law insisting on strict enforcement of arbitration contracts 
under the FAA. The Court also has systematically narrowed judicial review of 
arbitration challenges to those specifically targeting arbitration clauses. Most 
recently, the Court in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds Int’l Corp. and Rent-A-
Center v. Jackson further fueled an overall pro-enforcement policy toward 
arbitration contracts even if it impedes class relief or allows arbitrators to 
determine their own jurisdiction.86   
 
a. Stolt-Nielsen’s Stance on Class Arbitration 
 
In recent years, concerns have heightened regarding the power of 
arbitration agreements to squash class action rights. Courts in California, for 
example, have become especially vigilant in holding class action waivers 
unenforceable in consumer contracts where they are likely to hinder statutory or 
small claims.87 Courts have found that such effective exculpatory clauses are 
unconscionable under state law.88   
This has prompted arbitral institutions such as the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”) to develop rules for class arbitration, thereby allowing for 
enforcement of arbitration without denying individuals’ rights to join together to 
                                                                                                                            
v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 812 (1995) (breaking from the 
majority to require express agreement to arbitrate statutory claims). 
86 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Rent-A-Ctr, W., 
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-80 (2010). 
87 See Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding class 
action waiver unenforceable where it targeted small consumer claims). 
88 See, e.g., id.; Gentry v. Super. Ct., 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 2007) (holding class 
action waiver in arbitration agreement unenforceable under California law). 
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save time and money in asserting their similar claims in class proceedings.89 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Green Tree 
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle delegated to arbitrators the determination of whether an 
arbitration agreement allows for class-wide arbitration.90 In the wake of these 
developments, arbitrators began ordering class proceedings as long as the parties’ 
arbitration agreement does not expressly preclude class proceedings.   
The parties in Stolt-Nielsen were operating on this canvas. In that case, 
customers of large shipping companies sought to assert class arbitration on their 
antitrust claims relying on their standard “charter party” contracts requiring 
arbitration in New York.91 After the dispute arose, the parties selected arbitrators 
and asked them to determine whether their arbitration agreement allowed for 
proceedings under the AAA’s class arbitration rules in light of their stipulation that 
the contract was “silent” and there was “no agreement” on that issue.92 The 
arbitrators decided that the agreement allowed for the class proceedings because 
the evidence did not show “intent to preclude” it.93 They nonetheless stayed the 
proceedings pending appeal of their determination. After the Court of Appeals 
reversed the District Court’s holding that the arbitrators’ decision was in “manifest 
disregard” of the law, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.94 
 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, and Justice 
Alito in a five to three decision held that the parties could not be compelled to 
participate in class proceedings.95 Justice Alito concluded that the arbitration panel 
had “imposed its own conception of sound policy” and exceeded its authority in 
finding that the sophisticated commercial parties involved in the action intended by 
                                                 
89 Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, AMERICAN. ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
(2010), http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936. 
90 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
91 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. 1758. 
92 Id. at 1765-67. 
93 Id. at 1769 n.7. 
94 Id. at 1766-67 (Justice Sotomayer taking no part in the decision). 
95 Id. at 1776-77. 
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their silence to allow for class arbitration.96 Instead, Justice Alito opined that class 
proceedings would dramatically alter the nature of arbitration by hindering 
efficiency and secrecy of the process.97 In doing so, his opinion reversed presumed 
allowance for class arbitration proceedings and announced federal substantive law 
precluding class relief unless parties show clear intent for its allowance. 
The opinion left unanswered questions regarding the viability of the 
“manifest disregard of the law” standard for vacating arbitration awards. It also 
called into question the Bazzle plurality opinion’s designation of arbitrators to 
determine whether agreements allow for class arbitration.98 In addition, Justice 
Alito’s opinion also left open whether an arbitration agreement that is silent with 
respect to class arbitration may nonetheless allow for class proceedings in contexts 
not addressed in this case.99 Furthermore, courts have struggled post-Stolt Nielsen 
in deciding the extent to which they may use state contract law or public policy to 
interpret or strike class arbitration waivers, let alone sever the waivers to order 
arbitration.100   
                                                 
96 Stolt-Nielsen S.A., 130 S. Ct. at 1769-77. 
97 Id. at 1776-77.  Justice Alito seems to assume that bilateral arbitrations are confidential, 
but that is only true to the extent that the parties agree to confidentiality standards in their 
arbitration contract.  See Amy J. Schmitz, Untangling the Privacy Paradox in Arbitration, 
54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1211, 1212-30 (2007) (discussing distinctions between privacy and 
confidentiality in arbitration). 
98 Stolt-Nielsen S. A., 130 S. Ct. at 1768-72 (declining to decide if the “manifest disregard” 
exists and a non-statutory ground for vacating arbitration awards, and explaining that the 
Bazzle opinion finding that the arbitrator and not the court should determine whether an 
arbitration agreement allows for class arbitration was merely a plurality opinion).  
99 Id.  
100 See Fenterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 132-39 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding 
that Stolt-Nielsen did not preclude the court from holding the class waiver unconscionable, 
but it did bar the court from severing the waiver to enforce arbitration because the parties 
have not expressly agreed to arbitration); Mathias v. Rent-A-Ctr., Inc., 2010 WL 3715059, 
at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010) (holding that Stolt-Nielsen did not require that the FAA 
preempts state contract interpretation principles derived from policy); Fisher v. Gen. Steel 
Domestic Sales, LLC, 2010 WL 3791181, at *1-4 (D. Colo. Sept. 22, 2010) (holding an 
arbitrator can determine whether a contract allows for class arbitration, but finding that the 
inquiry under Stolt-Nielsen must focus on whether the contract expressly or impliedly 
authorizes class claims).  
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Accordingly, Stolt-Nielsen’s arguably pro-arbitration opinion is likely to 
foster inefficient litigation about arbitration. The opinion also has led some courts 
to strike arbitration clauses entirely where they otherwise may have severed 
offending class waivers to nonetheless order arbitration.101 Furthermore, the 
Court’s opinion in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion could have a significant 
impact on the future of class-wide arbitration. As noted above, the Court will soon 
provide its opinion on whether the FAA preempts a state court from using 
unconscionability to condition enforcement of an arbitration clause on preserving 
consumers’ ability to join together in class-wide arbitration proceedings.102 
 
b. Rent-A-Center’s Enhancement of Arbitrators’ Power 
 
 Pursuant to First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan and its progeny, a 
court must consider parties’ claims going to the scope or validity of an arbitration 
agreement unless the parties “clearly and unmistakably” delegate those questions 
to the arbitrators.103 This means that courts presumptively consider parties’ 
contract defenses to enforcement of arbitration agreements. These defenses are 
generally “gateway” questions of arbitrability for the court, as opposed to 
questions directed to the underlying contract as a whole.104 
 In Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, however, the Supreme Court opened the 
doors to reversing that presumption by endorsing enforcement of delegation 
clauses.105 In that case, an employee sought to assert his discrimination claims 
against Rent-A-Center in court despite an arbitration agreement that gave the 
arbitrator “authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, 
                                                 
101 See Fenterstock, 611 F.3d at 132-39 (striking entire arbitration clause); Brewer v. 
Missouri Title Loans, Inc., 323 S.W.3d 18, 18-24 (Mo. 2010) (finding that Stolt-Nielsen 
requires courts to strike arbitration clauses entirely and allow parties to proceed to litigation 
where courts find a class waiver unenforceable under contract law). 
102 See  AT&T Mobility, L.L.C. v. Concepcion, No. 09-893 (U.S. filed Jan. 25, 2010). 
103 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). 
104 Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-78 (2010). 
105 Id. at 2776-85. 
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applicability, enforceability or formation” of the agreement. He claimed that the 
arbitration agreement was unconscionable because it was adhesive and contained 
an onerous fee-sharing provision, and that this unconscionability claim was a 
gateway question of arbitrability for the court.106 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed, but the United States Supreme Court reversed that determination. 
 In a five to four decision, the Court held that the unconscionability 
challenge was for the arbitrator to determine under the provision in the parties’ 
arbitration agreement that delegated authority to the arbitrator to determine 
questions of the arbitration agreement’s enforceability.107 Writing for the Court, 
Justice Scalia opined that this delegation narrowed courts’ authority to only 
consider challenges to that delegation, and not arguments directed toward the 
arbitration provision as a whole. The employee therefore had to assert his 
unconscionability challenge in arbitration, thereby allowing the arbitrator to 
determine his or her own power to decide the discrimination claims.108  
This decision has made it difficult for parties to get a judicial 
determination of their arbitration agreement challenges. It has now become routine 
for companies to include delegation provisions such as that in Rent-A-Center in 
their standard arbitration clauses, and it requires creative lawyering to craft 
challenges that strike at the delegation provision instead of the arbitration clause as 
a whole.109 Furthermore, the Court’s endorsement of such delegation clauses 
triggers deferential review of the arbitrator’s determination of arbitrability 
challenges.110 This adds an extra layer of insulation for companies’ use of 
arbitration, and may hinder consumers’ impetus to even attempt to challenge 
onerous arbitration provisions.   
                                                 
106 Id. at 2776-78. 
107 Id. at 2776-81. 
108 Id. at 2778-81. 
109 Muhammad v. Advanced Servs., Inc., 2010 WL 3853230 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 24, 2010) 
(holding that employee’s challenge to the arbitration agreement went to the arbitrator under 
a delegation provision contained in that agreement). 
110 Amway Global v. Woodward, 2010 WL 3927661 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2010). 
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What’s more, the opinion’s pro-delegation stance conflicts with Stolt-
Nielsen to the extent the Court in that case took away the arbitrator’s power by 
overriding the arbitrator’s determination allowing for class proceedings. The two 
opinions are nonetheless consistent to the extent they reach pro-business results. 
Rent-A-Center stopped consumers from challenging enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement in court; Stolt-Nielsen stopped the shipping customers from joining 
forces to assert their statutory claims as a class. 
 
III. AMBUSH ON ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER CLAIMS 
 
Initially, private means for resolving claims were en vogue even in 
consumer and employment contexts. Private dispute resolution was touted as 
allowing for amicable, efficient and relatively inexpensive access to remedies and 
claim settlement. In the current public/private power polemic, however, there has 
been an about-face, and new legislative initiatives target enforcement of arbitration 
agreements in these uneven bargaining contexts. Furthermore, these initiatives 
indicate a policy pushback to the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence. 
 
A. Early Push for Private Dispute Resolution 
 
Consumer activism became a means for political protest as abolitionists 
boycotted slave-made goods during the Civil War period, and protestors acted 
collectively in refusing to purchase Japanese silk during World War II.111 Activism 
was a public act, and consumers advocated for change through public actions. As 
warranty and consumer protection laws developed, however, individuals’ disputes 
became private concerns. Individual consumers shifted their focus from public 
protesting, to using consumer protection legislation in bringing private claims 
                                                 
111 LAWRENCE B. GLICKMAN, BUYING POWER: A HISTORY OF CONSUMER ACTIVISM IN 
AMERICA 31-33, 187-245 (2009) (chronicling the history and development of consumer 
activism in the United States). 
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against sellers and manufacturers. Consumer concerns focused on simply obtaining 
remedies for their own accord, and private dispute resolution offered attractive 
avenues for such endeavors. 
Meanwhile, arbitration gained a positive reputation as a chief private 
dispute resolution mechanism capable of easing court congestion and allowing for 
less costly and more efficient claims resolution.112 By the 1960s, some states 
implemented compulsory arbitration of small claims. For example, Pennsylvania 
adopted a system for requiring arbitration to settle all claims under $2,000, which 
led to monetary and time savings for consumers and courts.113   
In the 1970s, President Jimmy Carter proposed consumer protection 
legislation that included a consumer protection agency similar to that now to be 
constituted under Dodd Frank.114 These proposals included arbitration or other 
alternative dispute resolution programs as means for consumers to cheaply and 
efficiently obtain remedies without clogging the courts. Furthermore, these 
initiatives reflected a positive attitude toward such private resolution of consumers’ 
B2C disputes. Although the proposals never became law, they passed the House or 
Senate five times in seven years.115 Dodd-Frank now gives life to the consumer 
                                                 
112 Leon Sarpy, Arbitration as a Means of Reducing Court Congestion, 41 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 182, 183-87 (1965) (emphasizing the benefits of arbitration and discussing the 
Pennsylvania program in particular). 
113 Id.  
114 See, e.g., Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 6437, 95th Cong. (1977); Consumer 
Protection Act, H.R. 6118, 95th Cong. (1977); Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 702, 95th 
Cong. (1977); Consumer Protection Agency Act, H.R. 2709, 94th Cong. (1975); Consumer 
Protection Act, H.R. 1266, 94th Cong. (1975); Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 1183, 94th 
Cong. (1975); Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 13163, 93d Cong. (1974); Consumer 
Protection Act, H.R. 2336, 93d Cong. (1973); Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 564, 93d 
Cong. (1973); Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 21, 93d Cong. (1973); Consumer Protection 
Agency Act, H.R. 14, 93d Cong. (1973) (all exemplifying bills with respect to these 
consumer protection initiatives). 
115 See Mark Green, How the Business Lobby Beat the Consumer Protection Bill, CHI. 
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agency, but targets instead of supports increased use of arbitration for resolution of 
consumers’ claims. 
 
B. Growing Concerns Leading to Proposed Changes 
 
From 1970 to present, the discussions regarding arbitration have changed 
and debate has escalated about the propriety of enforcing pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in B2C contracts. Proponents of strict arbitration enforcement advance 
arbitration as a means for fostering efficiency by saving parties and courts time and 
money in resolving disputes. Furthermore, they argue that companies contain 
dispute resolution costs by using pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their contracts, 
and pass this savings to individuals through lower prices and better products.  
Studies also indicate that individuals fare quite well in arbitration proceedings, and 
some arbitration administering institutions require companies to abide by protocols 
or rules that seek to protect procedural fairness for consumers and employees who 
must arbitrate their claims under the companies’ contracts.116   
Commentators and policymakers seeking to ban pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses in B2C contexts argue that these clauses rob consumers of their rights to 
judicial recourse, and unfairly advantage corporate “repeat players” who routinely 
include arbitration clauses in their form consumer contracts.117 They add that 
                                                                                                                            
Current+file%29&edition=&startpage=B1&desc=How+the+business+lobby+beat+the+con
sumer+protection+bill (last visited Apr. 20, 2011). 
116 See JAMS Consumer Arbitration Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses: Minimum Standards 
of Procedural Fairness, JAMS, July 15, 2009, http://www.jamsadr.com/consumer-
arbitration/ [hereinafter JAMS Fairness Standards] (last visited Apr. 27, 2011); Statement 
of Ethical Principles for American Arbitration Association, an ADR Provider 
Organization, AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,  
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22036 (last visited May 3, 2007) [hereinafter AAA 
Statement of Ethical Principles]; See also W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the 
Inviduation Critique, 49 ARIZONA L. REV. 69, 87-91 (2007)  (discussing how providers 
may insist that companies abide by their due process protocols or rules). 
117 See e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637 , 637 (1996) 
(critiquing companies’ use of arbitration clauses in contracts with consumers and 
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companies use these clauses to evade statutory regulations, bar class actions, and 
shield the public from information regarding corporate improprieties. Critics of 
arbitration emphasize that arbitration clauses are especially problematic when 
consumers’ claims involve statutory violations such as those dealing with health or 
safety.118 Moreover, these arbitration clauses usually bind consumers who rarely 
read the clauses, let alone understand what the clauses mean or how the clauses 
may hinder consumer claims.119   
These adhesive realities of consumer arbitration led the AAA to create a 
National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee (Advisory Committee), which 
promulgated the 1998 Consumer Due Process Protocol (Protocol).
120
 Drafters of 
the Protocol expected that companies and arbitration providers would voluntarily 
follow the Protocol’s “shoulds,” which include clear notice of arbitration clauses, 
provision of information regarding the arbitration process, preservation of 
consumers’ access to small claims court, and measures ensuring reasonable costs 
and hearing locations for consumers.121 Many arbitration providers have 
                                                                                                                            
employees); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not Fit, 
16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 633 (2001) (critiquing arbitration of employment claims); 
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrapping and Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Arbitral Infatuation 
and the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L REV. 1381, 1410-14 (1996) (critiquing 
industries’ use of arbitration provisions); Teri J. Dobbins, The Hidden Costs of 
Contracting: Barriers to Justice in the Law of Contracts, 7 J. L. SOC’Y 116, 116-18 (2005) 
(discussing lower-income individuals’ disadvantages in bargaining and seeking contract 
remedies). 
118  See Paul D. Carrington, Regulating Dispute Resolution Provisions in Adhesion 
Contracts, 35 HARV . J. ON LEGIS. 225 (1998) (suggesting legislative regulation of 
consumer, employment, and franchise arbitration); see also Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules 
from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 704, 704-
712, 754 (1999) (discussing how “arbitration privatizes the creation of law”); see also Amy 
J. Schmitz, Mobile-Home Mania? Protecting Procedurally Fair Arbitration in a Consumer 
Microcosm, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 291, 313-15, 371 (2005) (discussing form 
arbitration agreements’ potential to privatize dispute resolution). 
119 See Charles L. Knapp, Opting Out or Copping Out?  An Argument for strict Scrutiny of 
Individual Contracts, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 95, at 101-18 (2006) (recognizing lack of true 
assent and the dominance of form documents in consumer contracts). 
120
Consumer Due Process Protocol, NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE, April 17, 1998,  http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019 [hereinafter Protocol]. 
121 Id. 
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promulgated procedural fairness standards or special rules for consumer arbitration 
that comply with the Protocol’s “shoulds.”122 Furthermore, some attorneys have 
encouraged companies to comply with such standards in adopting arbitration 
provisions in their consumer contracts.123   
Nonetheless, not all companies have implemented these Protocols and 
criticisms of consumer arbitration have escalated. In 2009, arbitration providers 
such as the AAA were so concerned with complaints  regarding arbitration of 
consumer debt collection actions that they ended or suspended their administration 
of this type of arbitration.124 Furthermore, fairness concerns regarding arbitration 
clauses in uneven bargaining contexts led Congress to bar enforcement of 
arbitration requirements in active duty military members’ consumer credit 
contracts and in motor vehicle franchise contracts.125 Congressional concerns about 
                                                 
122 See JAMS Fairness Standards, supra note 116 (noting fairness rules JAMS follows); 
AAA Statement of Ethical Principles, supra note 116 (also providing for fairness 
standards).   
123 Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements by Consumer 
Financial Services Providers, in 12th Annual Consumer Financial Services Institute 51-52 
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1165, 2007), WL 1591 PLI/Corp 
35 (“My message to clients: Draft a fair clause!”); Christian Bruce, Consumer Credit – 
Arbitration: Neutrality of Arbitrators Needs Scrutiny, Attorney says, Calling for More 
Discovery, 68 U.S. L. WK. 2095 (1999) (noting Kaplinsky’s advice that clients adopt 
balanced arbitration provisions and  allow consumers to choose the administrator in order 
to ward off repeat-player bias claims). 
124 See Notice on Consumer Debt Collection Arbitrations, American Arbitration 
Association, http://www.adr.org.sp.asp?id=36427  (last accessed Aug. 24, 2010); 
Arbitration or Arbitrary:  The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debt, 
Hearing Before the Domestic Policy Subcomm. of the Oversight and Gov’t Reform Comm., 
111th Cong. 6 (2009), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Naimark071025.pdf (testimony of Richard W. 
Naimark on behalf of the AAA stating AAA’s moratorium and offering suggestions for 
improving fairness of consumer arbitration). 
125 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 
670(a) (codified at 10 U.S.C. §987 (2006)) (making arbitration clauses unlawful in 
consumer credit contracts with military); Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Act, § 11028, 
Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2002)) (limiting 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate motor vehicle franchise disputes to post dispute, 
written contracts, and requiring written explanations for any arbitration awards).   
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consumer arbitration also prompted hearings questioning the fairness of consumer 
arbitration.126  
At the same time, reports of companies’ abuses of arbitration clauses 
has led to continual reintroduction in Congress of the Arbitration Fairness Act 
(“AFA”), which would amend the FAA to bar enforcement of pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in consumer, employment, and franchise contracts, and 
any disputes arising under a statute protecting civil rights.127 The AFA also 
would reverse the United States Supreme Court’s “separability” ruling, which 
directs courts to consider only questions going to the validity or scope of an 
arbitration clause itself. The AFA would therefore require that courts 
determine arbitration agreement challenges regardless of whether a challenge 
specifically targets the arbitration provision.128   
                                                 
126 The Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Hearing on “Mandatory 
Binding Arbitration Agreements: Are They Fair for Consumers,” 110th Cong. 69 (2007), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/36018.PDF; see also 
Simone Baribeau, Consumer Advocates Slam Credit-Card Arbitration, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, July 16, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0716/p13s01-wmgn.html 
(discussing lack of consent and onerous terms in consumer arbitration clauses and 
Congressional hearings regarding the fairness of arbitration). 
127 The AFA of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).  Rep. Johnson recently reintroduced 
the bill in the House of Representatives with more than 35 cosponsors.  Rep. Johnson Seeks 
to Strengthen Consumer, Employee Rights, Feb. 12, 2009, available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga04_johnson/2009_02_12_arbitration_fairness_drop
s.html (noting optimism for passage of the bill due to momentum and 35 original 
cosponsors) (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).  Campaigns for its passage have begun.  See, e.g., 
Pete Mackey, The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 – Get Behind It, Feb. 10, 2009, INJURY 
BOARD BLOG NETWORK http://mobile.injuryboard.com/miscellaneous/the-arbitration-
fairness-act-of-2009-get-behind-it.aspx?googleid=256974.  But see Matt Masich, 
Arbitration Changes Brewing in Congress, 7 LAW WEEK COLORADO, at 12 (April 4, 2009) 
(quoting and citing comments by Amy Schmitz to the reporter regarding the AFA, 
including a comment that Congress may not focus on the AFA this year due to “bigger fish 
to fry.”). 
128Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).  But see, 
Developments in the Law– Access to Courts, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Proposals 
for Reform of Consumer-Defendant Arbitration, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1170-81 (2009) 
[hereinafter Access to Courts] (discussing the Act and critiquing its blanket approach); The 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782 & H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007) (primarily 
sponsored by Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA), but never 
passed). 
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Proposals for the AFA are accompanied by a rote list of “findings” that 
“most” consumers have no choice but to accept arbitration clauses when they make 
purchases and that arbitration undermines public law.129 The AFA findings also 
state that arbitration providers “are sometimes under great pressure to devise 
systems that favor the corporate repeat players who decide whether those 
companies will receive their lucrative business,” and arbitrators are given “near 
complete freedom to ignore the law and even their own rules.”130 The findings add 
that companies impose arbitration provisions “that deliberately tilt the systems 
against individuals” by eliminating statutory remedies, banning class actions, and 
requiring individual to arbitrate far from their homes. The findings also denounce 
courts for upholding “egregiously unfair mandatory arbitration clauses.”131 These 
findings are not accompanied by empirical evidence or other evidentiary support. 
 
C. Possible Demise of Arbitration Under the Dodd-Frank Act  
 
The 884-page Dodd-Frank Act will “streamline nearly every aspect of the 
American financial industry,” and has been touted as “the largest financial industry 
reform package” since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.132 The Act generally 
adds oversight provisions and other regulations to existing laws such as the TILA 
and Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and creates the new CFPB.133 It also 
establishes a wide array of rules and regulatory powers that impact nearly every 
aspect of financial products or instruments that affect consumers.   
                                                 
129 The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (stating findings 
in Section 2). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Cody Vitello, The Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 and What it Means for Joe & Jane 
Consumer, 23 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 99, 100 (2010) (giving summary of changes to 
existing agencies). 
133 Id.  See also, Linda Singer, et al., Breaking Down Financial Reform, 14 J. CONSUMER & 
COM. L. 2 (2010) (parsing Dodd-Frank’s provisions). 
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This Article will not discuss all of these provisions, many of which have 
garnered media attention because they address financial institution mistakes that 
led to the near economic meltdown. Instead, this Article focuses only on the often-
overlooked provisions that target arbitration clauses. The Article also proceeds 
with caution in its discussion of Dodd-Frank in light of recent calls by Republican 
leaders and financial industry lobbyists to repeal the Act. Some opponents of the 
Act also plan to challenge the law as an unconstitutional delegation of power to 
regulators not subject to proper judicial review.134   
Nonetheless, Dodd-Frank already has had immediate impact with no need 
for further regulations with respect to arbitration provisions in mortgage 
contracts.135 The Act amended the TILA to ban pre-dispute arbitration provisions 
in mortgages, reflecting the previously mentioned distrust of arbitration for debt 
related disputes.136 This also carves out a class of TILA claims that otherwise may 
be arbitrated in accordance with the Supreme Court’s holdings.137 Dodd-Frank also 
bars enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements with respect to claims 
under the whistle-blower provisions of the Act.138 
The remainder of Dodd-Frank provisions impacting arbitration relies on 
further agency action. The first is the provision giving the CFPB’s broad 
responsibility to conduct studies, hold hearings, and establish regulations limiting 
or barring enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in contracts between 
consumers and financial product or service providers.139 That said, it is unclear if 
and when the CFPB will take action with respect to pre-dispute arbitration clauses. 
                                                 
134 See Clarke & Roberts, supra note 7 (highlighting challenges against the Act as 
unconstitutional and calls for its repeal). 
135 Dodd-Frank Act § 1414, to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §1639(c) . 
136 See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing the AAA moratorium on 
consumer debt collection arbitrations). 
137 Supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting the Court’s holding). 
138 Dodd-Frank § 1414.  The provision amends TILA and is to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1639(c) (effective July 22, 2010, for provisions that do not call for regulations).      
139 Dodd-Frank Act § 1028. 
ARBITRATION AMBUSH IN A POLICY POLEMIC 
 
83 
This is due to not only calls for Dodd-Frank’s repeal but also the especially heated 
challenges to the naming of a director to head the Bureau.140    
As of this Article’s completion, no CFPB director has yet been named, and 
some have voiced concern that there will still be no director in place by July, 2011, 
when several federal agencies are scheduled to transfer powers to the new 
Bureau.141 The problem is that the CFPB cannot issue any new regulations with 
respect to arbitration until after a director is confirmed and the necessary powers 
are transferred to the Bureau.142 Furthermore, once a director is in place, the 
Bureau is expected to focus on more pressing concerns than arbitration such as 
establishing tougher consumer lending disclosure requirements.143   
At the same time, the CFPB will have to take cautioned steps in 
promulgating any preclusion or regulation of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in 
consumer financial contracts. First, the Bureau must conduct a formal study of 
arbitration involving these consumer contracts and report the findings to 
Congress.144 The CFPB then may create the regulations “in the public interest and 
for the protection of consumers, and may not restrict consumers’ rights to agree to 
arbitration post-dispute.”145 Furthermore, these regulations will be subject to the 
usual Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) public comment rules and may 
                                                 
140 See Clarke & Roberts, supra note 7 (noting challenges for the CFPB). 
141 See Protess, supra note 8 (noting challenges Republicans and financial industry 
lobbyists plan to launch against the CFPB and whomever President Obama nominates to 
head the bureau); Damian Paletta & Victoria McGrane, U.S. Seeks Chief for Financial 
Consumer Agency, Wall. St. J., Dec. 30, 2010, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204204004576050120167058068.html 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2011) (noting concerns and difficulties in naming a director). 
142 See Singer supra note 133, at 2-10 (noting powers and steps to be taken for it to begin 
making rules and regulations); Paletta & McGrane, supra note 141 (noting need for 
director to issue certain new rules). 
143 See Paletta & McGrane, supra note 141 (discussing the CFPB’s priorities, which will 
include creation of simplified credit card and mortgage disclosures); Dave Clarke, Analyis: 
Consumer Chief Delay Could Hobble New Agency, REUTERS, Sept. 7, 2010, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/09/07/us-financial-regulation-consumer-analysi-
idUSTRE6864BC20100907 (reporting on the delay to name a CFPB Director). 
144 Dodd-Frank Act § 1028(a) (failing to clarify who must conduct the study, how it must 
be done, or the scope of what it must cover). 
145 Id. at § 1028(b). (leaving unclear what these standards mean). 
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apply only to new contracts entered into 180 days after their effective date.146 It 
would therefore be surprising, if not impossible, for any arbitration regulations to 
have real impact before 2012 or 2013. 
Finally, the Dodd-Frank Act also amends the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 to give the SEC power to “prohibit, or impose conditions or limitations on 
the use of, agreements that require customers or clients of any broker, dealer, or 
municipal securities dealer to arbitrate any future dispute between them arising 
under the Federal securities laws, the rules and regulations thereunder, or the rules 
of a self-regulatory organization if it finds that such prohibition, imposition of 
conditions, or limitations are in the public interest and for the protection of 
investors.”147 This is somewhat of a sleeping giant, in that it has not received 
publicity but it could have serious impact on how investors resolve disputes with 
brokers and dealers.   
Under this provision the SEC has power to put an end to the now universal 
use of pre-dispute contract clauses that require investors and anyone working or 
dealing in the securities industry to assert their claims in binding arbitration 
proceedings.148 The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), which 
regulates securities firms doing business in the United States, generally administers 
all of these arbitrations.149 FINRA has a roster of nearly 7,000 arbitrators and 
arbitrates cases in 72 locations throughout the United States, and in London and 
Puerto Rico. It also is quasi-public to the extent that it is subject to SEC 
oversight.150 Accordingly, SEC arbitration clause exclusions or other regulations 
                                                 
146 Id. at § 1028(c). 
147 Id. at § 921(a) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (1934)).  
148 See Rew Robert Goodenow, Securities Arbitration- - The Supreme Court Resolves the 
Issue of Enforceability of Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Broker-Investor Contracts: 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 73 IOWA L. REV. 449, 449 (1988). 
149 Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Arbitration & Mediation, About FINRA 
Dispute Resolution, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Overview 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2011); FINRA, About  the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, 
http://www.finra.org/About (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). 
150 About the FINRA Dispute Resolution, supra note 149.  
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pursuant Dodd-Frank would impact not only all those involved in the securities 
industry, but also the mammoth FINRA arbitration program. 
 
IV. ADDRESSING CLASHING POLICIES THROUGH MEASURED REGULATIONS 
 
The Supreme Court and Congress have been pursuing clashing policies 
with respect to consumer arbitration: The Court is reinforcing a pro-enforcement 
agenda while Congress is considering regulations and legislation barring 
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in B2C contexts. The Court also 
seems to support pro-business conclusions while Congress has become more 
sympathetic to pro-consumer proposals for limitations on arbitration. This has 
instigated a polemic regarding consumer protections with arbitration caught in the 
crossfire. It is time to call a truce to prevent an unwarranted ambush against 
arbitration agreements. 
The use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in B2C contracts is not all bad or 
all good. There are valid concerns about consumer arbitration and some companies 
do abuse use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses. As noted above, some companies 
use these clauses to hide their transgressions and impede consumers’ access to 
remedies on their statutory and other claims. This has generated consumers’ 
negative attitudes toward companies’ heavy-handed use of arbitration clauses and 
form contracts. Consumers’ angry postings on Internet “blogs” further augment 
this distrust of companies’ contracts and reveal frustrations with form terms.151   
Such negativity suggests reason for concern. Furthermore, it harms 
consumer confidence and the overall market regardless of whether it is 
                                                 
151 See Consumer Focus Group Notes, conducted by Amy J. Schmitz, Denver, Colo., Nov. 
18, 2006 (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Consumer Focus Group] See (recounting 
instances when salespersons said terms were not subject to any alteration); Victoria 
Pynchon, The Fine Print: Sprint’s Arbitration Clause, Negotiation Blog, 
http://www.negotiationlawblog.com/arbitration/the-fine-print-sprints-arbitration-clause 
posted on July 7, 2007 (last visited Jul. 31, 2007) (reporting company’s representative’s 
response to a request to see the contract terms). 
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warranted.152 This negativity, combined with courts’ uncertain applications of 
contract defenses to void arbitration provisions, instigates consumers’ continual 
challenges of arbitration provisions. This litigation then clogs the courts and 
hinders arbitration’s purported efficiency benefits.153   
However, it is unwise to ambush arbitration clauses by barring them under 
the AFA or through all-or-nothing regulations promulgated by the CFPB and SEC.  
Reports of arbitration’s negative impacts on consumers may be flawed. Instead, 
evidence suggests that consumers may fare better in arbitration than in litigation.154  
For example, a 2009 study of AAA consumer arbitrations found that consumers 
were successful in 53.3% out of 301 arbitrations studied and recovered an average 
of $19,255, or 52.1% of the damages they sought in those arbitrations.155 There is 
need for more comparison statistics for B2C litigation, but the data overall 
nonetheless suggests that consumers generally attain satisfactory results in 
arbitration proceedings.156 
                                                 
152 Consumers lament general distrust and helplessness against companies’ form contracts 
and arbitration clauses.  See Consumer Focus Group, supra note 151. But see Christopher 
R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 204-215 (2006) 
(highlighting conflicting evidence regarding arbitration’s “lawlessness”).  
153 See Rent-A-Ctr, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2777-80 (2010); Prima Paint 
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967); Walton v. Rose Mobile 
Homes, L.L.C., 298 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2002) (each discussing courts’ unpredictable 
application of contract defenses and other challenges of arbitration clauses). 
154 See Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer 
Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1054-75 (2009) 
(questioning Public Citizen’s report concluding that arbitration is bad for consumers); 
Harris Interactive, Arbitration: Simpler, Cheaper, and Faster than Litigation – Conducted 
for U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform, Apr. 2005, at 6, available at 
http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2005HarrisPo
ll.pdf (last visited May 22, 2009) (indicating that among those who lost, 40% still said they 
were moderately to highly satisfied with the process). 
155 Searle Civil Justice Inst. Task Force on Consumer Arbitration, Consumer Arbitration 
Before the American Arbitration Assoc. Preliminary Report, SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE 
INSTSEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., at 68-87 (Mar. 2009) (reporting findings).  Although the 
study also found that business claimants succeeded in 83.6% of their cases, this does not 
necessarily indicate bias for companies because their claims were straight-forward 
nonpayment claims while consumers usually assert more murky warranty claims. 
156 See The Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card industry Using it to Quash Legal 
Claims?  Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the 
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In addition, many companies draft arbitration clauses for their consumer 
contracts that comply with the Protocol, and providers often promulgate rules 
safeguarding fairness in consumer proceedings.157 The AAA’s consumer rules, for 
example, cap arbitrator fees for claims of $75,000 or less at $250 for Desk 
Arbitration or Telephone Hearing and $750 per day for In Person Hearings.158  
Furthermore, the AAA rules cap consumers’ arbitrator fees at $125 for claims that 
do not exceed $10,000 and $375 for claims exceeding $10,000 but not $75,000.159 
Opponents of pre-dispute arbitration clauses respond to this evidence with 
arguments that parties can enjoy arbitration’s cost savings and efficiency benefits 
through simply using post-dispute arbitration agreements. However, post-dispute 
agreements are rare in consumer cases, and companies cannot rely on cost savings 
based on hopes consumers will agree to arbitrate post-dispute.160 This impedes 
companies from pricing products or otherwise passing along cost savings from 
arbitration programs. Moreover, most companies have no interest in pursuing post-
dispute arbitration in B2C contexts. The AFA and possible regulations barring 
arbitration in consumer financial product contracts would therefore lead to 
elimination of B2C arbitration proceedings and their potential benefits for many 
individuals and companies. 
Still, the Supreme Court has been unduly heavy-handed in its strict 
enforcement of arbitration agreements. The Court’s pro-enforcement and lasses 
                                                                                                                            
House Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009) (testimony of Christopher 
Drahozal) (acknowledging need for comparison statistics for B2C litigation). 
157 Searle, supra note 155, at 70-87. 
158 Am. Arb. Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration Costs, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22039 (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2011) (rules effective Sept. 15, 2005; fees effective Jan. 1, 2010). 
159 Id. The AAA consumer rules also shift payment of administrative fees to companies, 
and cap these fees for claims not exceeding $75,000.  
160 Others also have argued that the AFA approach of barring enforcement of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in broad and ill-defined categories was over- and under-inclusive, and 
that it may be more beneficial to legislate procedural reforms.  See, e.g., Recent Proposed 
Legislation, Arbitration – Congress Considers Bill to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration 
Clauses for Consumers, Employees, and Franchisees – Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 
1782, 110th Cong. (2007), 121 HARV. L. REV. 2262, 2267-68 (2008) (critiquing the Act’s 
broad scope and approach). 
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faire attitude has failed to acknowledge lack of consent and sometimes flawed 
procedural fairness in arbitration where uneven bargaining contexts are involved. 
Furthermore, uncertainty in the case law has left consumers and companies 
wondering when arbitration programs will be enforceable.161   
The Supreme Court and Congress both seem to be going too far – in 
opposite directions. Instead, arbitration policies should allow for pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, but condition their use on compliance 
with procedural fairness rules. This more measured regulatory approach should 
clarify and build on the “shoulds” the Protocol now suggests. In particular, 
regulations should include requirements with respect to the following:162 
 
• Notice: Companies should adequately alert consumers about a required 
arbitration process, and provide transparency by clearly and concisely stating in their 
contracts how consumers can file claims and where they can find further resources. This 
should include contact information for the designated arbitration providers, and list any 
fees a consumer must pay in order to file claims. 
•  Balanced Arbitrator Selection: The FAA requires a baseline degree of 
arbitrator neutrality. However, regulations should go beyond this baseline to ensure 
consumers have an equal voice in arbitrator selection, instead of the mere veto power that 
they often have under companies’ B2C contracts. Consumers should have power to choose 
an arbitrator from a list or database of arbitrators who have received an accreditation after 
completion of training and compliance with strict disclosure requirements.   
• Contained Costs: Although the overall cost differential of arbitration 
versus litigation is unclear, some companies’ arbitration clauses may impose high front-end 
filing and administration costs that hinder individuals from bringing claims. Mandatory 
                                                 
161 See id. (also noting how courts lack resources to address technological issues underlying 
many enforcement issues regarding e-contracts). 
162 These suggestions are discussed in greater detail in Schmitz, Regulation Rash, supra 
note 12, at 16-35 (discussing my proposal for a “top ten” for procedural regulations 
applicable to consumer arbitration in lieu of the AFA’s proposed ban on enforcement of 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts). 
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fairness regulations should preclude this, and establish filing fee caps similar to those under 
the AAA’s consumer arbitration rules discussed above.
163
 
•  Adequate Discovery: Lack of adequate discovery can be especially 
problematic in consumer warranty cases involving statutory violations. For example, a 
consumer’s warranty case may depend on company interoffice memoranda to prove 
company management’s knowledge regarding a defective product, but limited or uncertain 
discovery in arbitration may hinder the consumer’s ability to obtain such memoranda. 
Arbitration regulations should therefore give arbitrators clear authority to order necessary 
depositions and document production, and sanction parties for not complying with such 
discovery orders. Nonetheless, these regulations should preserve arbitrators’ discretion to 
set relevancy limits on this exchange of information, and allow for consideration of 
affidavits in order to minimize need for travel and expensive depositions.   
• Hearings in Consumers’ Home Locations: Regulations should give 
consumers the option of requiring that any B2C arbitration hearings be conducted in the 
consumers’ home location. Regulations also should foster efficiency by allowing for 
expanded use of expedited, telephonic, video, and other hearing options that eliminate need 
for expensive and time-consuming travel.
164
 Moreover, regulations should encourage and 
perhaps fund pilot programs for online dispute resolution (“ODR”). ODR has emerged as a 
means for minimizing travel, easing scheduling hassles, saving time, and reducing overall 
dispute resolution costs.165 In addition, face-to-face hearings may be less important when 
consumers simply seek monetary remedies and do not hope to maintain continued relations 
with the business. 
• Timely Decisions and Compliance with Awards: Time limits benefit 
companies and consumers. They foster arbitration's speed and efficiency, which are 
considered its key benefits. These limits also can be especially beneficial for consumers in 
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 See Am. Arb. Ass’n, supra note 158, and accompanying text (discussing the AAA’s fee 
schedule for consumer claims).  
164
 See Protocol, supra note 120, at Principle 6(a) (calling providers to develop "programs 
which entail reasonable cost to Consumers based on the circumstances of the dispute, 
including, among other things, the size and nature of the claim, the nature of goods or 
services provided, and the ability of the Consumer to pay"). 
165 See Amy J. Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering 
Consumers through Regulated ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV.178 (2010) (discussing pros and 
cons of using online arbitration to resolve consumers’ B2C claims). 
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order to prevent companies from strategically delaying the process to avoid responsibility 
for consumers’ claims and paying any damages. Regulations should therefore specify time 
periods for each step in the arbitration process and for compliance with arbitration awards. 
Remedies have little value if consumers are unable or must unduly struggle to obtain them.   
• Preservation of Statutory Remedies: Regulations should bar limits on 
statutory remedies in arbitration unless the parties agree to limits after disputes arise. This 
recognizes that B2C contracting generally lacks the robust contractual freedom that 
supports pre-dispute contract remedy limits in business and other contexts. Furthermore, 
statutory rights deserve special protection in private arbitration proceedings to further their 
public interests. For example, statutes such as the TILA rely on individuals’ prosecutions 
of these claims to serve public interests in curbing illegal company conduct.  
• Public Disclosure of Awards Involving Statutory Claims: Although 
privacy has been a hallmark of arbitration and generally deserves preservation, it should 
not prevent public exposure of company improprieties.
166
 Arbitration regulations therefore 
should require disclosure regarding proceedings involving statutory claims to the extent 
necessary to foster the statutes’ public functions and preclude companies from using 
arbitration's privacy to escape liability or otherwise hide statutory violations.
167
 
•  Access to Small Claims Court: Legislative regulations should clearly protect 
consumers' access to small claims court for asserting claims seeking damages under a 
specified amount, such as $10,000.
168
 Although many companies already carve out small 
claims from their arbitration clauses, many do not and this access is important for 
consumers because these court processes are often less costly and time consuming than 
regular litigation or arbitration, and consumers often may represent themselves in these 
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 See Schmitz, supra note 97, at 1212–18 (considering benefits and drawbacks of privacy 
in arbitration). 
167
 See id. at 1230–34 (highlighting dangers of secrecy in arbitration). 
168
 See Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. (2000) 
(section 17(c)(11) of proposed rules requiring that parties have the right to opt out of 
arbitration for small claims). 





 Filing fees may be as low as $10 or $15, and parties do not 
pay for the judges' time as they generally must do in arbitration.
170
  
•  Allowance for Class Relief, Consolidation, or Joinder: B2C arbitration 
provisions have become notorious in certain industries for curbing or chilling consumers’ 
claims through class action waivers buried in arbitration clauses. Class action waivers 
hinder consumer claims and protect companies from the public exposure of large class 
actions, which companies are especially eager to avoid regarding statutory claims. 
Nonetheless, companies also include these waivers due to legitimate concerns regarding 
costly class actions that may force them into unwarranted or unfair settlements. At the 
same time, the Stolt Nielsen decision has led to courts’ confusion in deciding the extent to 
which they may use state contract law or public policy to interpret or strike class arbitration 
waivers or sever the waivers to order arbitration.171 Accordingly, regulations may be 
necessary to clarify when waivers are enforceable. For example, regulations could preserve 
class arbitration or class actions with respect to consumer claims for less than $10,000. 
This would protect consumers’ ability to join forces in asserting small dollar claims they 
otherwise would not assert due to the costs of launching individual arbitration proceedings. 
At the same time, small claims court access and increased use of ODR and caps on 
consumers' arbitration costs per the above suggestions may ease consumers' incentives to 
seek class relief by making it more economical to assert claims individually. This is not a 
perfect solution, in that the dollar limit is somewhat arbitrary and many companies specify 
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 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 116.530(a) (West 2007) (precluding presence of 
attorneys in small claims court); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-512(c) (2007) (allowing 
attorneys only if all parties agree to it). 
170
 See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 28.003–28.004 (Vernon 2004) (stating $10 filing 
fee for all cases up to $5,000, but charging additional fees if jury trial is requested); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-281, 22-501 –524 (2011) (charging $23 filing fee for small 
claims); N.Y. CITY CIV. CT. ACT § 1803(a) (Gould 2004) (assessing $15 filing fee for 
claims up to $1,000). 
171 See Fenterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 132-39 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding 
that Stolt-Nielsen did not preclude the court from holding the class waiver unconscionable, 
but it did bar the court from severing the waiver to enforce arbitration because the parties 
have not expressly agreed to arbitration); Mathias v. Rent-A-Ctr, Inc., 2010 WL 3715059, 
at 145 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that Stolt-Nielsen did not require that the FAA preempts 
state contract interpretation principles derived from policy); Fisher v. Gen. Steel Domestic 
Sales, LLC, 2010 WL 3791181, at 6-7 (D. Colo. 2010) (holding an arbitrator can determine 
whether a contract allows for class arbitration, but finding that the inquiry under Stolt-
Nielsen must focus on whether the contract expressly or impliedly authorizes class claims).  
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in their contracts that they will not arbitrate if a class waiver is held unenforceable.
172
 
Nonetheless, it at least provides a starting point for regulations aimed to protect consumers 




The debate has escalated regarding the proper role of government in 
regulating contracts and protecting consumers. This debate has captured questions 
regarding the propriety of enforcing pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer 
contexts. At the same time, the Supreme Court and Congress are approaching these 
questions in different ways: The Court is reinforcing arbitration enforcement; 
Congress and regulatory agencies are considering arbitration limitations or 
abolishment. Congress and the agencies carrying out its charge now hold the 
power to determine the outcome, and override the Court’s pronouncements 
through adoption of the AFA and/or regulations promulgated under Dodd-Frank.      
Despite concerns regarding some companies’ abuse of arbitration 
provisions, an ambush on B2C arbitration would be unwise. Arbitration can benefit 
both consumers and companies when properly administered. The focus of 
regulations therefore should be on ensuring fair procedures and practices with 
respect to consumer arbitration instead of simply barring enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration clauses. Moreover, clarifying regulations are necessary to quell 
the flood of inefficient and expensive litigation about arbitration. Accordingly, it is 
time for policymakers to rescue and revive arbitration from ambush by adopting 
carefully considered reforms that protect consumers without overly impeding 
beneficial use of arbitration. 
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 Cooper v. QC Fin. Servs., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1274–76 (D. Ariz. 2007) 
(addressing class action waivers). 
